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ABSTRACT: Contemporary Australian local government faces several daunting 
problems, not least escalating financial un-sustainability and local infrastructure 
depletion.  The main response of the various state and territory governments has taken the 
form of a series structural reform programs, with a strong emphasis on forced 
amalgamation.  However, widespread dissatisfaction with the consequences of these 
compulsory consolidation programs has led to a search for alternative policy solutions 
based largely on shared services and various types of regional co-operation between local 
councils.  This paper seeks to place proposed ‘regional’ solutions to contemporary 
problems in historical perspective by providing a comparative account of three distinct 
federal government initiatives of ‘region-directed’ policy in the post-World Two era: the 
‘nation-building’ of the 1940s; the ‘paternalism’ of the 1970s; and ‘self-sufficiency’ of the 
1990s.  We argue that, not withstanding the complex relationship between historical 
circumstances and changing state-federal relations, important lessons for current local 
government policy making can be learnt from a critical assessment of these episodes of 
federal intervention at the regional level.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary Australian local government is beset by a number of difficult 
problems.  Three distinct constellations of economic and political forces seem to 
have led to these problems.  Firstly, grinding ongoing financial distress has given 
rise to grave concerns over the financial sustainability of many local authorities, 
particularly in regional, rural and remote areas of the country.  In a path-breaking 
report, the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC 2001, pp. 52-3) identified 
five chief causes for the financial crisis in Australian local government: (i) 
‘Devolution’ – where a higher tier of government obliges local councils to 
assume new functions; (ii) ‘Raising the Bar’ – where a higher level of 
                                                          
1  The authors thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
the paper.  Brian Dollery would like to acknowledge the financial support provided by 
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government, through legislative enactments, increases the complexity and/or 
standard of provision of local government services thus raising costs; (iii) ‘Cost 
Shifting’ – where a municipal council provides a service for federal or state 
government agencies without adequate financial compensation and where a 
higher tier of government no longer provides an essential service thereby forcing 
a local authority to accept responsibility; (iv) ‘Increased Community 
Expectations’ – where local communities demand improvements to local 
services or the provision of an entirely new service; and (v) ‘Policy Choice’ – 
where a given council voluntarily expands or improves services.  In addition, 
local councils are also sometimes partially responsible for their financial 
problems; for example, in many instances local councils have been reluctant to 
strike rates and other charges and fees at realistic levels (Johnson, 2003). 
As a consequence of these financial pressures, existing service provision 
arrangements have been maintained only at the cost of depreciating local 
infrastructure.  This has obvious dire long-run implications for local government. 
In this regard, in its Final Report Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible 
Local Government, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics, Finance and Public Administration (2003a, p. 59) noted that ‘there is 
a significant infrastructure renewal gap across the country and asset standards are 
decreasing’. 
Secondly, there is ongoing concern by all state and territory government 
policy makers over the operational efficiency of local authorities, especially 
small regional and rural councils.  The primary policy instrument for addressing 
this perceived problem has been structural reform, with a strong emphasis on 
council amalgamations (Vince 1997).  During the 1990’s, South Australia, 
Tasmania and Victoria all experienced compulsory consolidation programs and 
more recently New South Wales and Queensland have also undergone 
compulsory amalgamation.  At the time writing the Northern Territory is poised 
for drastic structural reorganisation.  Only Western Australia has thus far escaped 
unscathed.  
Thirdly, in the past two decades the various enabling acts of the different 
Australian local government jurisdictions have been amended to give local 
councils greater latitude in conducting their affairs.  This has led to a substantial 
expansion of the role of local government and growing complexity in its 
relationships with state and federal governments (Dollery, Wallis and Allan, 
2006).  In this regard, the National Office of Local Government (NOLG) Annual 
Report for 2000-01 pointed to the excessively complicated intergovernmental 
institutions, which involved the Council of Australian Governments, in excess of 
forty Commonwealth-State Ministerial Councils and fora, the Local Government 
and Planning Ministers’ Council, and numerous other ministerial councils, many 
of which affect local government (NOLG, 2003, p. 8). 
In addition, significant differences in the functions of the different state local 
government jurisdictions have widened (Marshall, 2008, pp. 23-27).  As a result, 
state government oversight mechanisms are now dissimilar, which has served to 
diminish the possibility of a uniform national approach to local government.  
Moreover, an uneven devolution of additional functions to local councils both 
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within and between the state and territory local government systems has further 
complicated the pattern of intergovernmental relations. 
Various solutions have been proposed to tackle these problems.  As we have 
seen, amalgamation has been the main weapon in the arsenal of policy 
instruments employed in local government reform.  However, the results of 
council merger programs have proved disappointing.  This disillusionment has 
followed a series of national and state-based inquiries into financial sustainability 
into local government.  For instance, the South Australian Financial 
Sustainability Review Board’s (FSRB) (2005) Rising to the Challenge report 
defined financial sustainability and then assessed South Australian councils 
against this measure.  Along similar lines, the Independent Inquiry into the 
Financial Sustainability (LGI) for the New South Wales Local Government 
Association (2006) sought to determine financial sustainability in New South 
Wales local government.  More recently, an independent survey of one hundred 
of New South Wales’ most populated councils found that over one third are 
‘financially unsustainable’ (FiscalStar Services Pty Ltd, 2008: pp. 4 and 11).  
Both the (now defunct) Queensland Local Government Association’s (LGAQ) 
(2006) Size, Shape and Sustainability (SSS) program and the Western Australian 
Local Government Association’s (WALGA) (2006) Systemic Sustainability 
Study Inquiry considered financial sustainability in their respective local 
government systems, as did a report commissioned by the Local Government 
Association of Tasmania (LGAT) (2007).  At the national level, a study by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) entitled the National Financial Sustainability 
Study of Local Government examined the problem of financial sustainability in 
local government.  
These inquiries all found widespread problems of financial sustainability in 
may local councils, regardless of whether amalgamation had occurred in the 
jurisdiction in question.  Moreover, they were unanimous in dismissing 
amalgamation as a ‘magic bullet’ for tackling financial problems.  An important 
consequence of these deliberations has been a growing scepticism over the 
unsatisfactory economic, political and social outcomes of council amalgamations 
(Dollery, Byrnes and Crase, 2007a).  
As a result, alternative solutions have been canvassed. Three main avenues 
have been explored.  In the first place, some commentators have called for 
additional sources of revenue.  For example, Byrnes, Dollery, Crase and 
Simmons (2008) have proposed a municipal bond issue on the Australian equity 
market.  Secondly, others have called for greater funding from higher tiers of 
government, including the establishment of a Commonwealth Local 
Infrastructure Fund (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006; Dollery, Byrnes and Crase, 
2007b).  Thirdly, and most importantly, local councils across Australia have 
explored models of local government that present alternatives to amalgamation.  
These models are usually based on shared service arrangements and have 
displayed high levels of ingenuity (see, for instance, Dollery and Crase 2006).  In 
other words, shared services now represent the most important method of 
tackling the problems of contemporary Australian local government.  
However, the ongoing debate has ignored a potentially crucial aspect of the 
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move towards shared service models, which has been obliquely touched, but not 
examined in the WALGA Systemic Sustainability Study Inquiry (2006) with its 
Regional Model.  In essence, this ‘elephant in the room’ resides in the impetus 
shared services give to the evolution of existing local government towards a 
system of regional government.  This paper seeks to remedy this neglect in the 
literature by evaluating three historical antecedents of regionalisation in 
Australia in an effort to draw lessons from these failed episodes in 
Commonwealth policy that may help inform contemporary policy making.  To 
this end, we consider (i) the ‘nation-building’ of the 1940s; (ii) the ‘paternalism’ 
which characterised the drive to regional socio-economic equity in the 1970s; 
and (iii) the ‘self-sufficiency’ of the 1990s.  All these attempts were ‘top-down’ 
in nature and as such have embodied ‘regionalisation’, i. e. the initiation of 
structures designed by higher level of government, as opposed to ‘regionalism’, 
i. e. the initiation of structures from local and regional areas themselves (Gray, 
2004).  Interestingly, it was federal Labor Governments that pushed ahead with 
policies of regionalisation.  
The paper is divided into five main parts.  Section 2 discusses the 
Commonwealth government’s first major initiative in regionalisation in the 
1940s.  Section 3 tackles the Commonwealth’s second important initiative in the 
early 1970s.  Section 4 contemplates the Commonwealth’s third initiative the 
1990s.  Section 5 considers subsequent policy making in the area.  The paper 
ends by attempting to extract some useful lessons in a brief concluding section 6. 
2. THE COMMONWEALTH’S FIRST INITIATIVE: NATION 
BUILDING IN THE 1940s 
The Commonwealth first directed its attention toward regional Australia as a 
specific policy concern under PM John Curtin and the Minister for Post-War 
Construction and later PM Ben Chifley.  According to Sandercock (1975), 
underlying socio-economic policy objectives included the utilisation of natural 
resources, defence imperatives and urban decentralisation.  A plan for regional 
infrastructure and resource development arose through a series of 
Commonwealth/state conferences, culminating in 1949 with the publication of 
Regional Planning in Australia (Commonwealth Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction (CDPWR)).  This was preceded by other reports on public 
housing and social welfare which also encompassed regional planning (Reddel, 
2005, p. 188).  The CDPWR ‘attracted a variety of talented visionaries 
preoccupied with creating a better social climate’ (McMullin, 2000, p. 245), 
seeking national reconstruction by ensuring equitable living standards based on 
secure male employment, adequate housing and planned communities..  For 
social impact to be achieved, the CDPWR encouraged coordinated resource 
development in under-populated rural areas (Harris, 1976, pp. 108-9; Taylor and 
Garlick; 1989, p. 80).  
Under the CDPWR, the nation was divided into almost 100 regions leading 
to, in many instances, the establishment of ‘regional development committees’ 
(RDCs) that were expected to prepare resource inventories and regional plans 
‘directed towards the full development of the region’s resources in order to 
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maintain the maximum population’ (CDPWR, 1949, p. 18; see also Harris, 1989, 
p. 109; Neutze, 1989, p. 50).  The CDPWR’s purview extended beyond 
‘physical’ resources (listed as climate, physiography, water, soil, minerals, 
vegetation, fisheries and land-use) to ‘economic resources’ such as industrial 
development and ‘social resources’, including housing, hotels and hospitals 
(1949, pp. 21-4).  The Commonwealth and state Governments determined the 
regional boundaries together (Dore et al, 2003, p. 158).  RDCs were founded 
with significant Local Government representation, although composition varied 
between jurisdictions.  Municipal representatives generally comprised 50 per 
cent of membership, whilst the remainder consisted of ‘three or four senior 
officers of State Government departments resident in the region and two or three 
members who [were] prominent in commerce or secondary industries of the 
region’ (CDPWR, 1949, p. 17; see also Harris, 1989 p. 108).  The number of 
council delegates reflected the Commonwealth’s belief that councils could break 
out from their straitjacket of ‘wastebin’ functions to regional cooperation on 
broader issues.  
With national prosperity being the driving objective, there was substantial 
faith in the development potential of seemingly under-utilised regions, such as 
the Murray Valley (Orchard, 1999a, p. 20).  The subsequent Minister for Post-
War Reconstruction under PM Chifley, John Dedman, stressed in the CDPWR 
foreword (1949, p. 3) that ‘scientific study’ and the ‘careful working out of long-
range plans’ were vital in obtaining the ‘best use ... of our resources’.  This 
reflected the emerging notion of ‘wise use’ principles to guide and promote 
natural resource development (Frawley, 1994, p. 66), underscored by a complex 
interplay of social ideals and embryonic science.  Regionalisation provided an 
attractive administrative framework for this to occur.  Because modern 
environmentalism of the 1960s/1970s had yet to dawn, the CDPWR Report 
contained no reference to conservation other than listing ‘natural vegetation’ as a 
subset of ‘physical resources’. (1949, p. 22).  
Regional boundaries tended to observe council perimeters as ‘building 
blocks’.  The CDPWR believed that only ‘small differences’ existed between 
physiographic regional boundaries and Local Government borders, basing its 
functional regions mainly on physical factors such as “fundamental unity in 
topography” but also economic features and communities of interest (1949, p. 
22).  This was despite some of the archaic council borders based on old police 
districts (Power, Wettenhall & Halligan, 1981, p. 8; Barrett, 1979, p. 70; 
Larcombe, 1973, pp. 210-12).  Reliance on council borders would have offered 
considerable convenience due to the CDPWR’s intention to rely on individual 
councils to collect important information (1949, p. 22).  More importantly, it 
would have also reflected ‘communities of interest’ derived from ‘cultural and 
historical legac[ies]’ that had emerged from democratically elected councils with 
their headquarters at the centre of town (Dollery, Crase and Johnson, 2006, p. 
150). 
In 1949, the newly elected conservative Government led by PM Robert 
Menzies abandoned the scheme and returned all regional development policy to 
the states.  But it seems that the program had already suffered from deep-rooted 
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problems.  Neutze noteed that whilst some plans reached completion, 
implementation received insufficient attention (1989, pp. 50-1; see also 
Sandercock, 1975, p. 106).  The CDPWR’s own report failed to address this 
crucial element. Taylor observed that cost implications were ‘barely addressed’ 
(1990, p. 57), whilst Wettenhall and Power lamented that ‘debates of the period 
never explained clearly what was to happen to existing State and local units’ 
(1975, p. 201).  There must have been grave concern in some quarters that 
regional bodies set up by the Commonwealth might comprise one step towards 
reorganisation of the federal framework.  Whilst the CDPWR stressed that 
regional planning was ‘a matter primarily for the states’ (1949, p. 15), it provided 
little or no policy indication of how this was to happen.  Despite an express 
desire to avoid trespass on State jurisdiction (CDPWR, 1949, pp. 3, 15-6 and 
18), political suspicion and resentment increased (Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 12-
3; Orchard, 1999a, p. 21).  Wettenhall and Power (1975, p. 201) observe that by 
the late 1940s, the ‘mood’ of the nation was ‘anti-planning and avowedly pro-
federalist’.  But as we will see, intergovernmental conflict was to continue 
throughout all Commonwealth attempts to establish potentially strong regional 
institutions (Dore et al, 2003, p. 159). 
This jurisdictional tension within the federal system highlights the question 
of local government’s role in this nation building phase of regional policy.  PM 
Curtin himself had recognised local government’s inherent interest in assisting 
local economies (CDPWR, 1949, p. 1).  His successor, PM Chifley, was indeed a 
member of his local authority, the then Abercrombie Shire Council in the NSW 
Central West.  The CDPWR regarded councils as ‘most intimately concerned 
with conservation and development of regional resources’ (1949, p. 16).  But 
there is little mention in the Report of a role for local government beyond 
feeding information into the inventories.  Whilst the Report refers to councils 
being advised of regional plans through the RDCs (CDPWR, 1949, p. 19), there 
is nothing beyond passing reference about how councils might have given effect 
to them.  This is not surprising.  At that stage, Local Government’s functional 
activity was narrow and primitive (Maiden, 1966, p. 128; Purdie, 1976, p. 37).  
Councils had no background at all in strategic planning.  Furthermore, having 
been weaned on subservience to colonial and state governments, they had 
minimal experience in entering into partnerships with other spheres of 
government.  In short, local government was ill-equipped to seize opportunity 
from a poorly planned, albeit well-intentioned scheme, despite the initial 
involvement of local representatives. 
3. THE COMMONWEALTH’S SECOND INITIATIVE: PATERNALISM 
IN THE EARLY 1970s 
The municipal and regional terrain again underwent dramatic change after the 
1972 federal election of the Labor Whitlam Government, which sought a closer 
relationship with local government.  In his pre-election policy speech, future PM 
Gough Whitlam promised that Labor would ‘make local government a genuine 
partner in the federal system’ (quoted in Wettenhall and Power, 1975, p. 203).  
Furthermore, he believed that ‘some programs and services of government 
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[were] most efficiently and effectively planned, coordinated, and delivered at a 
level intermediate to those of state and local government’ (press statement 
quoted in Harris, 1976, p. 101).  The result, according to Jones (1989, p. 163), 
was local government’s rescue from ‘long-term decline and impending 
irrelevance’.  Labor saw local government as a convenient mechanism through 
which to pursue regional fiscal equalisation in terms of equity of access to public 
services, especially in poorer outer metropolitan areas (Taylor and Garlick, 1989, 
p. 81).  This arguably led to a major opportunity for local government to enter 
the national stage.  The rhetoric and policy trajectory stood in contrast with the 
previous conservative government’s establishment of the National Urban and 
Regional Development Authority, whose main task was to advise the Prime 
Minister, William McMahon, and guide the making of grants to the states on 
urban and regional matters (Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 20-1).  But this was to be 
shut down by tumultuous change under PM Whitlam. 
At least two major and directly related policy shifts arose.  First, an overhaul 
of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) led to substantial injection of 
funding to local authorities.  This had to be carried out via the states because 
direct funding to local government is constitutionally unlawful.  A referendum 
launched by the Whitlam government to overcome this problem was 
unsuccessful.  Nevertheless, a new financial nexus between municipal and 
Commonwealth governments via the state governments provided a foundation 
for local government’s maturity.  The system, subject to sequential structural 
change (Johnson, 2003, p. 53), is still in place.  Significantly, because the grants 
are unconditional, there is no assurance on how the moneys are spent.  
According to the Commonwealth, the main object of the ‘general purpose’ 
component of ‘federal assistance grants’ (FAGs) is to ‘strengthen’ local 
government and ‘promote equity between councils’ (Department of Transport 
and Regional Services (Cth), 2003, p. 29).  Together with local rates, the FAG 
mechanism remains a centrepiece of Australian local government revenue.  
Second, the Whitlam Government developed a novel way to disperse FAG 
revenue.  Councils could only apply for funding through compulsorily 
established ROCs (originally known as ‘regional assemblies’), a fresh regional 
structure established by Minister Uren’s Department of Urban and Regional 
Development (DURD).  Whilst the legislation enabled grants to be made directly 
to the ROCs themselves, this never took place (Else-Mitchell, 1976, p. 191; 
Fulop and Sheppard, 1988a, p. 6).  Instead, the ROCs served as funding conduits 
for FAGs and other funding schemes (Advisory Council for Inter-Governmental 
Relations, 1986, p 55; Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 157-192; Parker, 1978, p. 407; 
Miles, 1976, p. 180; Hawker, 1975, p. 28).  In his autobiography, Uren described 
FAGs as ‘the beginning of an evolutionary process that … changed local … 
politics forever’ (1994, p. 270).  Their purpose was not to supplement rate 
income but, in PM Whitlam’s own words, to enable poorer councils ‘to provide a 
standard of services to their communities that will be comparable with that 
enjoyed by communities elsewhere’ (House of Representatives Parliamentary 
Debates, Hansard, 17 May 1973, 2304; see also Else-Mitchell, 1978, p. 75; Self, 
1985, pp. 4, 46-7; DURD, 1975, p. 4).  In order to move forward to regional 
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social equity, the CGC undertook the complex task of surveying areas 
throughout the nation in terms of revenue-raising capacities and expenditure 
disabilities (Thomson, 1979, p. 90).  
Membership of the Department of Urban and Regional Development’s ROCs 
was limited to local government, with about 80 bodies inaugurated (Osborn and 
Robin, 1989, p. 51).  Importantly, unlike the previous RDC system, the ROC 
system included metropolitan areas (Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 615; Huxley, 
2000, p. 132).  This highlights the peculiarity of countless current references to 
‘regional’ Australia as meaning ‘non-urban’ Australia.  As soon as one moves 
away from rural physiographic factors alone, social and economic dimensions 
demand inclusion of metropolitan areas and, indeed, the wider landscape.  
The DURD invested substantial research into choosing relevant council 
boundaries, dismissing the 1940s lines as ‘somewhat arbitrary’ (DURD, 1975, p. 
11).  It divided metropolitan areas by means of socio-economic data whilst 
identifying rural regions through analyses of ‘interaction of people and 
activities’, with most attention given to the methodologically interesting notion 
of telephone traffic (DURD, 1975, pp. 7-8, 19).  Ecological factors played no 
role at all.  Although the DURD did intend at a later stage to map ‘large 
ecosystems’ throughout Australia (DURD, 1975, p. 19), the system was 
disbanded before such opportunity arose.  The Commonwealth never recognised 
natural resource management as an obvious ROC function.  The primary aim 
was to help ‘minimise spatial economic and social inequities’ across regions 
through direct participation by a better-funded local government (Taylor and 
Garlick, 1989, p. 81).  
The Whitlam/Uren ROCs never became major forces.  The CGC regarded 
them as mere ‘administrative devices’ or ‘post-offices’ that collated funding 
submissions (Hawker, 1975, p. 28; see also Miles, 1976, p. 180; Parker, 1978, p. 
407).  Fulop and Sheppard (1988b, p. 615) describe the CGC as a politically 
conservative bureaucracy that refused to cooperate in what it saw as an intrusion 
into state territory.  In any case, the level of CGC grants received by councils 
comprised ‘a relatively minor part of that Government’s spending on urban and 
regional development’ (Manning, 1992, p. 50).  
While the ROC system was driven by the underlying idea of socio-economic 
equity, it was only one of several regionalisation initiatives under the 
Whitlam/Uren government, with these other initiatives reflecting the paternalism 
of the administration more precisely.  The Commonwealth instituted the 
Australia Assistance Plan (AAP), which established Regional Councils for 
Social Development to coordinate social welfare programs.  These were very 
different to ROCs, being based on fresh boundaries and ‘controlled by citizen’s 
groups’ rather than councils (Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 616).  This 
imposition of jurisdiction by federal government helped fuel municipal 
discontent with Commonwealth regional policy. Fulop and Sheppard noted that 
councils ‘either avoided the AAP or … played an obstructionist role’ (1988b, p. 
615; see also Reddel, 2005, p. 191).  Another strong regional scheme was the 
doomed Growth Centre Program, designed to facilitate decentralisation to 
selected centres with improved services.  There were also further DURD 
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projects, including the Area Improvement Program (AIP), which assisted the 
sustainability of active ROCs.  Whilst the AIP placed emphasis on particular 
welfare, employment and infrastructural projects (Huxley, 2000, p. 133), in 
many circumstances it ceded total discretion on expenditure to ROCs and local 
authorities.  In one instance, funds were used for controversial parkland 
development at Auburn in western Sydney, involving construction of an artificial 
hill (Lloyd and Troy, 1981, pp. 45-57).  Interestingly, the location is now 
recognised by the local council as having significant potential for a habitat 
corridor, containing remnant patches of important ecological communities and an 
endangered plant species. 
Power and Wettenhall (1976, p. 122) claim that other Commonwealth 
authorities were ‘not far behind’ in developing ‘comprehensive regionalising 
schemes’. But the abundance of regional programs was poorly coordinated 
(Harris, 1976, p. 109; Wettenhall and Power, 1975, p. 207).  Power and 
Wettenhall (1976, p. 119) go as far as to portray ‘veritable chaos’.  It must have 
provided a confusing milieu for local government which, apart from distant 
memories of the 1940s, was unfamiliar with Commonwealth interest, let alone 
enforced regional structures.  Those councils that did exploit the ROC 
mechanism were far more interested in receiving money to supplement rate 
revenue and repay debts rather than embracing the Commonwealth’s regional 
vision (Power and Wettenhall, 1976, p. 123; Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 615; 
Daly, 2000, p. 214). 
State governments resented interference with their traditional jurisdictional 
territory, viewing the ROCs as an unnecessary tier of government that threatened 
their own power base.  Councils adopted a similar view notwithstanding that 
DURD sought to strengthen local government’s financial muscle (Chapman, 
1997, p. 46; Harris, 1989, p. 120).  The Commonwealth insisted that the ROC 
network could ‘eventually lead to permanent forms of regional organisations 
without necessarily disrupting existing systems’ (DURD, 1975, p. 2).  Yet local 
government remained generally suspicious, seeing ROCs as a first step towards 
dismantling individual authorities (Chapman, 1997, p. 46; Harris, 1989, p. 120; 
Miles, 1976, p. 180; Parker, 1978, p. 405).  Some councils were outright hostile 
(McPhail, 1978, p. 111; Bowman, 1983, p. 176).  King (1978, p. 108) citeed the 
vitriolic remarks of one NSW councillor from Port Stephens challenging a $1M 
Commonwealth grant for employment purposes.  Councils receiving minimal 
financial support were especially bitter (Self, 1985, p. 65).  As a result, local 
government raised little resistance when the subsequent conservative Fraser 
Government, elected in 1975, stopped ROC support and shut down many federal 
regional programs.  Councils were more preoccupied with coming to grips with 
managing their own undertakings rather than pursuing active participation in 
additional regional arrangements.  As a result, the overwhelming majority of 
ROCs foundered.  
The DURD’s regional experiments were too short-lived to bear fruit.  But 
even with more time, their downfall was probably inevitable.  The concept of 
regional priorities being determined by structures imposed from above was 
arguably misplaced.  In 1976, Harris suggested that: 
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‘[i]t is hardly conceivable that a regional view could emanate from a 
Regional Organisation of Councils, or that all local government areas within 
a defined region faced sufficiently common problems as local authorities to 
enable such a regional view to emerge’ (1976, p. 103).  
It appears that this criticism was based on the compulsory nature of the 
ROCs, together with the then limited outlook of individual councils, rather than 
any lack of appreciation of regional dimensions to municipal activity.  Harris 
went on to refer to the ‘significant advantages’ of regional cooperation, noting 
that some functions such as ‘physical and environmental planning decisions’ 
were suitable for cross-boundary collaboration (1976, pp. 106-7).  In similar 
fashion, Power and Wettenhall (1976, p. 118) argued that ‘regionalism … 
imposed from above is usually a weaker form than that which could emerge if 
the initiatives arose from within the region itself’ (see also Wettenhall and 
Power, 1975, p. 208; Gray, 2004).  Grounds (1987, p. 1) is more direct in 
attributing the ROCs’ ultimate failure to their involuntary nature. Morgan (1993, 
p. 4) holds a similar view, pointing to their ‘prescriptive nature and undertones of 
compulsion’.  
A handful of DURD ROCS have survived, including the Western Sydney 
ROC (WSROC), Illawarra ROC (IROC) south of Sydney (now known as the 
‘Southern Councils Group’) and the Hunter ROC (HROC, renamed ‘Hunter 
Councils Inc’) in the Newcastle region.  WSROC then represented Australia’s 
most heavily funded region (Fulop and Sheppard, 1988b, p. 615; Fulop and 
Sheppard, 1988a, p. 6), which must have helped galvanise municipal 
commitment.  Those ROCs that outlasted the Fraser Government’s cutbacks did 
so only because of financial and political support from member councils.  They 
tended to be located in socially disadvantaged areas that had fared best under 
Whitlam’s fiscal equalisation policies such as, notably, the AIP scheme.  
It is at least feasible that the DURD’s efforts helped lay groundwork for later 
regional municipal collaboration (McPhail, 1978, p. 111; Orchard, 1999b, p. 
200).  A novel, ongoing and evolving network of voluntary ROCs has since 
arisen from the ashes of DURD.  Their purpose, however, is not to provide a 
channel for Commonwealth funding.  Rather, they themselves seek revenue from 
any source available, with co-operative well-crafted grantsmanship skills derived 
from earlier experience.  This tends to undermine any criticism that the DURD’s 
efforts were merely fleeting.  It should also be borne in mind that local 
government was then turning the corner into functional expansion.  Land use 
planning schemes were emerging, albeit slowly (Wilcox, 1967, pp. 207-11), 
giving councils ‘unprecedented power’ to influence land value through zoning 
controls (Harrison, 1988, p. 27).  In addition, some councils took the initiative to 
embrace the social environment, providing community, welfare and cultural 
services such as personal counselling, subsidised meals and arts festivals 
(Rentschler, 1997, pp. 130-3; Miles, 1976, p. 175; Walsh, 1989, p. 118).  These 
fall within the broad umbrella of ‘human’ services (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, 2003a, 
p. 10; Dollery, Wallis and Allan, 2006, p. 555; Dollery, 2005, p. 392).  For those 
councils keen to modernise their portfolios, the Whitlam/Uren government 
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provided considerable potential for new ideas. 
4. THE COMMONWEALTH’S THIRD INITIATIVE: THE SELF-
SUFFICIENCY OF THE 1990S 
The Commonwealth’s third major entry into regional policy was heralded by 
the Taskforce on Regional Development which produced Developing Australia: 
A Regional Perspective, chaired by Bill Kelty (Australia. Taskforce on Regional 
Development, 1993).  The report enjoyed wide release but received strong 
criticism due to the unrealisable hopes it engendered for new infrastructural 
investment throughout provincial Australia (Alexander, 1994, p. 6; Forth, 1996, 
pp. 76-8).  Nevertheless, it prompted national debate on regional development 
which became a strong element in the Commonwealth’s Working Nation policy 
(Fulop, 1997, p. 221; Keating, 1994).  This was one of numerous 
contemporaneous documents on regional issues (Beer, 2000a, p. 176), including 
the prominent ‘McKinsey Report’ (McKinsey and Company, 1994) which has 
been widely regarded as the ‘most influential’ (Fulop and Brennan, 1997, p. 1; 
see also Beer, Maude and Pritchard, 2003, p. 15; Fulop, 1997, p. 221).  After the 
Labor party came to power in 1983 under PM Bob Hawke, the Commonwealth 
instituted various regional arrangements but none directly involved local 
government (Beer, 2000a, pp. 175-6).  A more fervent program based on 
‘strategic planning’ arose after the takeover of PM Paul Keating in 1991 (Beer, 
2000a, p. 177).  
Regional policy under Keating was very different from the Whitlam/Uren 
approach.  It embraced a heavy emphasis on economic development (Hurley, 
1994b, p. 23), still grounded on concerns about regional disparity but less 
anxious about redistributive fiscal justice.  Whilst the initiative was politically 
expedient, it might be argued that it lacked any ‘widely-shared’ philosophical 
underpinning other than promoting economic efficiency (Hurley, 1994b, p. 25; 
see also Garlick, 1997, p. 277).  More recent environmental imperatives such as 
‘ecologically sustainable development’ (ESD) were, according to Alexander 
(1994, p. 23), ‘effectively sidestepped’.  
Major differences from the earlier programs included modesty in funding 
(Sorensen, 1994) and a fresh vision of government as facilitator rather than the 
driving force (Taylor and Garlick, 1989, p. 99).  The deal was to provide a 
climate for economic initiative from within the regional communities themselves 
(Martin and Woodhill, 1995, p. 174). Hurley (1994a, p. 5) deciphers the regions 
as ‘units propelling the national economic wagon ... discouraged from seeing 
themselves as recipients of assistance from a state gravy train’.  This ethos of 
regional self-help saw funds made available under the Regional Development 
Program (RDP) for the establishment of voluntary structures, known as Regional 
Development Organisations (RDOs, originally known as Regional Economic 
Development Organisations), with membership determined by the regional 
communities themselves.  The earlier pattern of enforced regionalisation was 
thus replaced with a novel form of centrally prodded regionalism – i.e. a 
federally supported and flexible bottom-up structure.  Another parallel program 
was the establishment of Area Consultative Committees to assist local 
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communities in improving employment levels and training schemes (Beer, 
2000a, p. 176).  
Because RDOs were to arise from the ground upwards, the issue of top-down 
boundary delineation became redundant.  It was expected that regional leaders, 
from both the private and public sector, would join together to form the new 
bodies with their spatial areas of interest reflecting local economic catchments. 
RDOs did not emerge everywhere (Beer, 1999, p. 188), and some proved 
stronger than others.  Municipal borders again formed the ‘building blocks’ 
although according to Garlick (1999, p. 181), drawing firm lines at the periphery 
was not a major issue.  
One reason for the formation of new bodies rather than utilising councils was 
the Commonwealth’s belief that local government had not played ‘a sufficiently 
active role’ in regional economic development (Fulop and Brennan, 1997, p. 21; 
see also Munro, 1994, p. 15).  According to Forth (1996, p. 81), the 
Commonwealth was initially unwilling to support RDOs that were ‘effectively 
controlled’ by local government.  Yet such opposition ignored local 
government’s traditional preoccupation with boosting local economic growth as 
had been recognised by PM Curtin as far back as the 1940s.  As Marshall noted 
(1997, p. 13), the Working Nation document stipulated that local government 
was assumed to provide a ‘key role ... in initiating and establishing RDOs’.  
Local government was quick to position itself as a key stakeholder. It generally 
saw itself as having the ‘biggest stake’ in regional development, thereby wanting 
to ‘play a dominating role’ in controlling RDO agendas (Fulop and Brennan, 
1997, p. 21).  A survey of RDO personnel confirms local government’s heavy 
involvement, including substantial contribution to RDO funding (Marshall, 1997, 
p. 13). Northwood (1995, p. 32) refers to Local government’s ‘pivotal’ role, 
providing examples of close linkages between voluntary ROCs and RDOs. 
In 1996, the newly elected Howard Government abolished the RDP, resulting 
in the dismantling of most RDOs across the country.  Whilst some RDOs 
survived, in other places local government filled the gap via voluntary ROCs.  It 
appears that regional economic development has since been a dominating 
concern in voluntary ROC circles.  Significantly, the Commonwealth never 
dictated the functions of RDOs but made funds available for the preparation of 
regional economic strategies.  Implementation of such strategies, of course, was 
scarcely straightforward (Murphy and Walker, 1995, p. 128).  The RDOs had no 
political constituency, organisational experience or reliable income beyond the 
lifetimes of their grants.  It is interesting to speculate whether local government, 
given the same opportunity, would have achieved more. 
A chief lesson from the RDP experience is the sheer vulnerability of central 
government regional programs.  Despite the potential popularity of a regional 
scheme, it will always be liable to abandonment upon change in political 
direction.  There is, of course, no lasting tradition of regional structures in 
Australia.  But the RDP did attract a level of council interest that had been absent 
during previous excursions into the regional arena.  This may be explained, in 
part, by local government having become a far more aggressive and sophisticated 
institution.  But more importantly, RDOs were voluntary.  Local government 
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was prepared to jostle with other stakeholders to claim its share of the funding 
pie and play an active role in shaping regional priorities.  It did not want to be 
left behind, believing it had an essential, if not the cardinal, contribution to make.  
This illustrates the point that bottom-up regionalism is unlikely to emerge by 
itself but requires some form of financial, administrative and/or policy push.  It 
also exemplifies modern local government’s keen nose for new funding sources 
(Harris, 1976, p. 106).  
A significant result of RDO activity was unevenness.  Some regions suffering 
from ‘geographical spread, lack of regional identity or political disunity’ suffered 
from obvious disadvantages (Murphy and Walker, 1995, p. 125).  Remoteness 
and sparseness of populations will always mitigate against successful cross-
boundary structures.  Additional funding to bring people together may help.  Yet 
most successful RDOs depended largely on ‘personality and local goodwill’ 
(Murphy and Walker, 1995, p. 125).  Such ingredients are vital.  They will not be 
manufactured by legislation or new funding sources alone. 
5. SUBSEQUENT DIRECTIONS 
After the fall of the Keating Government in 1996 and the ascendancy of 
conservative PM John Howard, the Commonwealth initially set up no major 
regional structures after dispensing with the RDP (Beer, 1999, p. 188).  Yet the 
claim that Commonwealth interest in regional development policy ‘evaporated’ 
(Beer, 2000b, p. 114) under the Howard Government can be assessed, with 
hindsight, to be overstated.  The Commonwealth did not ignore local problems, 
especially after its re-election in 2002 when rural councils could compete against 
a wide spectrum of community bodies for funding under a variety of programs 
(Beer, Maude and Pritchard, 2003, pp. 261-2).  These were not driven by 
environmental needs, but by community wants.  It is arguable that such moves 
were designed to assuage disgruntled rural citizens, who saw themselves as left 
behind in the expanding benefits of national urban economic growth.  In fact, the 
level of funding was higher than what had been offered under PM Keating (Beer, 
Maude and Pritchard, 2003, p. 261).  Again, local government was only one 
party at the coalface.  This was a time of increasing demands on councils, many 
of which might have regarded the new arrangements as peripheral.  
Collits (2007, pp. 186-7) also draws attention to a later initiative of the 
Howard government to establish a panel to undertake ‘Regional Business 
Development Analysis’.  Similar to PM Keating’s experiment; this afforded a 
funded ‘bottom-up’ approach but did not establish or even support any particular 
regional arrangements.  Instead, it relied on the three spheres of government 
operating together in a strategic manner.  Whilst the concept may have offered 
some benefits, it was cut short.  Perhaps the traditional local political fear against 
regional government remained afoot. 
Moreover, the Howard government continued to fund the Area Consultative 
Committees initiated by the Keating government in 1994, although the role of 
these Committees changed from one being concerned principally with the issue 
of regional employment (as was initially stipulated with their formation under 
the Employment Services Act 1994) (Albanese, 2008, p.2), to funding a variety 
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of types of projects, including educational programs, business alliances, 
investment strategies, adjustment packages and grant writing workshops, all 
under an extended charter within the framework of the Regional Partnerships 
Program.  While there was no mandated involvement of local government, the 
interface in terms of projects and personnel was in some instances marked (see, 
for example, NENWACC, 2002).  
Two other areas of policy pursued by the Howard government involved 
significant funds being directed toward the regions.  The first of these was the 
use of Natural Resource Management (NRM) bodies to address environmental 
degradation and ecological sustainability.  Summarising this effort, Moore (2005, 
p. 123) noted that National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality Program 
(NAP) was initially targeted at 21 ‘designated priority catchment areas across 
Australia’ and as such was regionally directed.  It involved initial funding of $1.4 
billion over seven years.  Although a proportion of the initial funding came from 
state and territory governments, it was topped up through a National Heritage 
Trust amount of $1.5 billion in 2001, with a further $300 million added in 2004 
to cover all 56 regions in Australia. Moore (2005, p. 125) offered the view that as 
well as addressing concerns of environmental sustainability, ‘regionalising 
provide[d] a framework for progressing the government’s self-help approach’. 
The second major initiative taken by the Howard government was the Roads 
to Recovery (R2R) funding, designed to address the problem of local road 
infrastructure nearing the end of its useful life and where replacement costs were 
deemed to be outside the financial capability of local government.  Summarising 
this funding, Dollery, Pape and Byrnes (2006, pp. 2-3) noted that 70 percent of 
the initial $1.2 billion (or $850 million) was designated to rural and regional 
Australia from the period January 2001 to June 2005.  Additionally, a 2002 
review of the program extended this funding to 2009 with an additional $2.55 
billion in funding.  While Dollery, Pape and Byrnes (2006, p. 3) noted the 
program was subject to the [pedestrian] criticism of pork-barrelling, of far more 
significance were their observations that ‘R2R has broken with longstanding 
tradition in Australian fiscal federalism by its sheer scale in bypassing state and 
territory governments that have typically redistributed federal funding to local 
government through their Local Government Grants Commissions.’  Moreover, 
they speculated that ‘it may also violate the Constitution’ and sought to 
demonstrate how this view could be taken (Dollery, Pape and Byrnes, 2006, pp. 
7-12). 
Taken together, the federal funding of NRM bodies at a regional level and the 
funding of the R2R program directly to local government would appear to 
signify a break with post-war liberal governments’ scaling down of 
programmatic financial commitment to regional development relative to their 
Labor counterparts, and to the financial support of local government in 
particular.  Further, a recent challenge to the federal government’s legality in 
delivering its ‘Nation Building and Jobs Plan’ in the High Court by Pape in Pape 
vs. Commissioner of Taxation of Australia (2009) (High Court of Australia, 
2009) signalled the potential for continued constitutional implications.  While on 
the one hand ALGA President Geoff Lake welcomed the High Court’s decision 
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to reject the constitutional challenge to the Federal Government’s stimulus 
package, with its potential implication that ‘councils [would be] required to pay 
back in the order of $6 billion of [federal] funding that has flowed to local 
government over the last few years’, on the other hand, he stated that: ’the 
uncertainty that this case created has the potential to arise again and indeed a 
differently composed High Court in the future could well decide these sorts of 
matters in a different way’; further asserting that the issue of funding would not 
be resolved until the Constitution was amended such that Federal government 
could directly fund local government (Government News, 2009).  We will return 
to this issue in our concluding remarks below.  
Arguably, however, the greatest legacy of the Howard government to 
regional policy and local government was its launching of major reports 
emphasising the financial un-sustainability of local government (see Brown, 
2005, pp. 29-32), including Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible Local 
government (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, 
Finance and Public Administration, 2003a; known as the ‘Hawker Report’). This 
key document, preceded by At the Crossroads – A Discussion Paper (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public 
Administration, 2003b), has been dubbed ‘the most comprehensive recent 
diagnosis on the ills of Australian local government’ (Dollery, 2005, p. 385).  It 
highlighted local government’s entrenched nature, functional expansion and 
ballooning financial desperation, even warning councils against entering 
functional territory beyond their financial capacity (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, 2003a, 
pp. 14-5).  This latter concern was re-echoed by the recent ‘FiscalStar’ report 
which warned that ‘financially unsustainable’ councils ‘face substantial 
rates/prices hikes or drastic services cutbacks (or both)’ (FiscalStar Services Pty 
Ltd, 2008, p. 4).  The response, undoubtedly, will be an ongoing march in favour 
of reduction of council numbers.  In his discussion of the Hawker Report, 
Dollery (2005, p. 389) attacked its consideration of the ‘advantages’ of enforced 
amalgamation as ‘draconian’.  At the same time, the Hawker Report also 
considered the benefits of a direct financial pipeline from the Commonwealth to 
local government, harking back to the Whitlam era (Brown, 2005, p. 30).  
Overall, the Howard government did not forsake local government.  Yet more 
was needed than thoughtful and disturbing reports and targeted funding programs 
for the electorally sensitive issues such of environmental sustainability and local 
roads. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The historical narrative sketched in this paper offers more than a fascinating 
story of municipal history.  Whilst cross-boundary approaches appear more than 
desirable, the history of regional structures pushed by the Commonwealth 
government suggests implementation is another matter altogether.  Despite 
various experiments, regional bodies with political power have never become a 
fixed part of the enduring regional administrative landscape.  Commonwealth 
regionalisation in particular has always been controversial.  Attempts to impose 
186 Andrew Kelly, Brian Dollery & Bligh Grant 
 
regional institutions from above have overwhelmingly failed due to a 
combination of poor planning, insufficient support, change in political climate 
and opposition from other spheres of government.  Local government has 
traditionally displayed a negative attitude, concerned about loss of dignity and 
potential amalgamation.  Yet its experience with the RDP during the 1990s 
signalled a softening of its conventional ‘dog in the manger’ mindset.  
However, it cannot be overlooked that local government is far more 
sophisticated than it was over a decade ago.  Whilst this may not be the case for 
remote struggling authorities, such councils are still vital to their local 
communities.  What is most interesting is that councils are becoming more 
confident in building up alliances and devising protocols with other local bodies, 
government agencies, the private sector and social organisations.  The spectrum 
of efficient, flexible and legitimate models is wide (Dollery and Johnson, 2005; 
Dollery and Johnson, 2007).  Even upwards delegation of specified functions to 
statutory regional bodies, such as county councils in NSW, provides an option 
(Kelly, 2003).  It is here where improved cross-border approaches may evolve 
without direct requirements imposed from above.  The FAG system could be 
reviewed with a separate portion of funding devoted to acceptable regional 
planning, leaving elected councils to design their own preferred subsystems.  
This could demonstrate consistency with the subsidiarity principle, which has yet 
to be largely accepted in Australia (Aulich, 2005, p. 209).  Any council that 
chooses not to be involved will receive no funding and remain answerable to its 
electorate.  Regional environmental management would be a good place to 
revise, revitalise or start anew.  Flexibility rather than rigidity must be the key.   
Beyond these positive, although incremental initiatives, the fact remains that 
the Commonwealth government is the only sphere with sufficient resources to 
support regional structures (Beer, 2000a, p. 170).  The Howard government’s 
funding of both NRM and R2R, when placed in historical continuum with the 
recent initiatives of the Rudd government, including the funding of the Local 
Infrastructure Program to the amount of $800 million (thus far) and the initiation 
of the Australian Council of Local Government (ACLG) in late 2008 under the 
newly christened Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development and Local Government (DTIRDLG, 2009) may signal a bipartisan 
approach (albeit by default) toward what Brown (2005, pp. 17-18) then regarded 
as highly unlikely, namely ‘a reversion to an interventionist, Keynesian or high 
investment approach’.  Moreover, for the first time, constitutional recognition is 
not just a partisan political issue (as it was in 1974 and, to a lesser extent, in 
1988), but has to be explored through the High Court and canvassed more 
broadly throughout the polity. 
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